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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

ACCESS TO DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS FOLLOWING
SEPTEMBER 11: A RETURN TO THE FUNDAMENTALS OF
RICHMOND NEWSPAPERS

I. INTRODUCTION
“The era that dawned on September 11, and the war against terrorism that
has pervaded the sinews of our national life since that day, are reflected in
thousands of ways in legislative and national policy, the habits of daily living,
and our collective psyches.”1 In the wake of September 11, 2001, a war
against terrorism was declared not only in Afghanistan, but also on our own
soil against hundreds of Arab and Muslim nationals living “illegally” in the
United States. As of December 2001, the Justice Department had detained
more than seven hundred people on immigration charges in connection with
the September 11 attacks.2 The vast majority of the deportation hearings
concerning these detainees have taken place behind closed doors pursuant to an
order issued by the office of the Chief Immigration Judge Michael Creppy,
known as the “Creppy Directive.”3 The Creppy Directive has caused
innumerable problems for the media groups seeking access to deportation
proceedings. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft4 and North Jersey Media Group,
Inc. v. Ashcroft5 represent two of these disputes.
Despite very similar reasoning, the two courts responsible for adjudicating
Detroit Free Press and North Jersey Media Group split on the issue of whether
the First Amendment affords a right of access to deportation proceedings. The
Sixth Circuit, in Detroit Free Press, concluded that the First Amendment
undoubtedly protects public access to deportation proceedings.6 Judge Keith
declared, “Today, the Executive Branch seeks to take this safeguard away from
the public by placing its actions beyond public scrutiny.”7 The Third Circuit,
in North Jersey Media Group, disagreed with the Sixth Circuit and concluded
that the First Amendment does not provide a right of access to deportation

1. N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 202 (3d Cir. 2002).
2. David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 961 (2002).
3. Harlan Grant Cohen, Note, The (Un)favorable Judgment of History: Deportation
Hearings, the Palmer Raids, and the Meaning of History, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1431, 1442 (2003).
4. 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002).
5. 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002).
6. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 700.
7. Id. at 683.
1101
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proceedings.8 The Third Circuit based this conclusion on the government’s
interest in protecting national security.9 Although the two circuits engaged in
ideological warfare when weighing national security against freedom of
information and access, a deeper, legal question emerged regarding the
application of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the area of public access
to judicial proceedings.
Many scholars have accurately characterized the Supreme Court’s right of
access precedent as confusing and ambiguous.10 After years of denying that a
constitutional right of access existed, the Supreme Court first announced that
the First Amendment protects access to information in criminal trials in
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.11 In this opinion, the Court framed a
two-part “experience and logic” analysis to provide lower courts with guidance
concerning the right of access included in the First Amendment.12 Although
the Court firmly established the two-pronged test in several cases following
Richmond Newspapers, it has failed to crystallize many important aspects of
that analysis. The ambiguity inherent in the Richmond Newspapers analysis is
evidenced by uncertainty and inconsistency in the lower courts.13 The
uncertainty of the Richmond Newspapers analysis is the most damaging during
times of national stress and insecurity. “[A] rule that limits a judge’s
discretion in deciding questions of core values can better preserve those values
during times of stress when pressures may affect proper decision making.”14
It is therefore essential that the judiciary identify the “core values” under
which the First Amendment right of access is to operate. The core values of
the right of access can be identified through a closer analysis of the foundation
for that right. Richmond Newspapers defined the right of access as necessary
to the structural interpretation of the First Amendment.15 For the First
Amendment to fulfill its purpose in fostering informed public debate, the
people must have access to information.16 This right must have practical
limitations of “experience and logic” to assure that public access will not
unduly interfere with government functions.17 When one considers the current
8. N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 204-05.
9. See id. at 217.
10. Kathleen K. Olson, Courtroom Access After 9/11: A Pathological Perspective, 7 COMM.
L. & POL’Y 461, 485 (2002); see also Michael J. Hayes, Note, What Ever Happened to the “Right
to Know”?: Access to Government-Controlled Information Since Richmond Newspapers, 73 VA.
L. REV. 1111, 1112 (1987).
11. 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980).
12. See id. at 588-89 (Brennan J., concurring).
13. See, e.g., N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d 198; Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d
681 (6th Cir. 2002).
14. Olson, supra note 10, at 488.
15. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 587-88 (Brennan, J., concurring).
16. Id. at 587.
17. Id. at 588-89.
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question of access to deportation proceedings in light of this substantive
principle, it is clear that Judge Keith of the Sixth Circuit applied the Richmond
Newspapers principles correctly in Detroit Free Press. The opinion issued by
Judge Keith affirmatively protects First Amendment rights while considering
the various implications of access on national security.
This issue will be explored as follows: Part II will introduce the reader to
the background principles and policy surrounding the First Amendment right
of access. Part III will discuss the Third and Sixth Circuits’ application of the
Richmond Newspapers analysis in North Jersey Media Group and Detroit Free
Press. Part IV will discuss the constitutionality of the Creppy Directive in
light of the fundamental interests of the Richmond Newspapers analysis. Next,
Part V will demonstrate that the Richmond Newspapers test is applicable to
deportation proceedings. Finally, Part VI will conclude that the First
Amendment does support a qualified right of access to deportation
proceedings.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A.

The Humble Beginnings of a Press Right of Access Under the First
Amendment

The Supreme Court has consistently recognized several rights under the
First Amendment, including the right of the press to publish and release
information freely without interference from the government as well as a right
of access to information. Neither right is explicitly granted through the
language of the First Amendment; rather, they are considered fundamental to
the operation of rights enumerated in the First Amendment.18 While the
Supreme Court has long recognized the right to send information without
government interference as fundamental under the First Amendment, the right
of access has not been given the same priority.19
In the case of New York Times Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court
refused to allow the government to restrict publication of sensitive materials.20
In June 1971, the New York Times and the Washington Post began to publish a
series of articles based on sensitive government documents surrounding the
war in Vietnam.21 The United States government sought to prohibit any
further publication of the documents, arguing that the publication would be
against the interests of national security.22 The New York Times argued that

18. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575; Hayes,
supra note 10, at 1113.
19. Hayes, supra note 10, at 1111.
20. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
21. Id.
22. Id. at 718.
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the documents contained materials that were largely historical and that
prevention of the publication of these articles was nothing more than prior
restraint.23 The Supreme Court, agreeing with the New York Times, stated that
“‘[a]ny system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a
heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.’”24 The Court then
noted, “The Government ‘thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification
for the imposition of such restraint.’”25 The Court subsequently found that the
government had not satisfied that burden and therefore could not prevent the
publication of the so-called Pentagon Papers.26 In retrospect, it seems that the
opinion in New York Times indicated that the Supreme Court would be
extremely wary of any government attempt to restrict publication of any
information, even in cases implicating national security. Therefore, it was
widely accepted after New York Times that any system of prior restraint would
have to bear “a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.”27
In light of the Supreme Court’s vigilance against prior restraint, it seemed
that members of the press would have an unlimited and unalienable right to
publish information whenever and however they deemed appropriate. While in
theory it was true that members of the media could publish whatever they
desired, the government and the court system controlled the right to publish by
limiting press access to information.28 Although New York Times protected the
press’s right to publish information, the opinion does not require that the
government give the press access to that information. The right of access
under the First Amendment developed slowly and is currently more limited
and less developed than the right of the press to publish any information that
they freely obtain. In fact, the Supreme Court refused to recognize a First
Amendment right of access until 1980, when the Court decided Richmond
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.29
For the majority of the 1970s, the Court refused to disallow any
government policy that limited press access to information. The judiciary
ignored pleas from the media as well as a change in public opinion demanding
23. See Rowena Scott Comegys, Note & Comment, Potter Stewart: An Analysis of His
Views on the Press as Fourth Estate, 59 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 157, 194 (1982).
24. N.Y. Times, 403 U.S. at 714 (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70
(1963)).
25. Id. (quoting Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)).
26. See id.
27. Id.
28. Olson, supra note 10, at 474. “Rather than limit what information the press could
print, . . . trial judges began to limit what information the press could gather by closing
courtrooms.” Id. In light of the decision in N.Y. Times, the courts were very limited in their right
to restrict publication of information that the media obtained. The court system retained the right
to close its doors to the media and therefore restricted publication by restricting their access to the
proceedings. Id.
29. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
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access to government information.30 The Watergate scandal created an
atmosphere of distrust and discontent among the public that lead to a demand
for information and government accountability.31 While the Court refused to
confront the issue of press access directly, the media found some potential for
judicial support in the case of Branzburg v. Hayes.32 Branzburg involved
several claims in which reporters were subpoenaed to appear in front of a
grand jury to reveal their sources. The reporters claimed that they would suffer
a severe burden if forced to reveal their sources and therefore should have a
“special privilege” allowing them to keep such information secret.33 Without
that privilege, the reporters claimed, they would be unable to effectively report
information because current and future sources would be unwilling to reveal
information.34 The Court refused to recognize a special reporter privilege,
emphasizing that “‘the publisher of a newspaper has no special immunity from
the application of general laws.’”35
Despite the Court’s general disapproval of a reporter’s privilege, the
majority opinion contained language indicating that the rights of the press
extended to more than the right to report information that was obtained from a
willing speaker.36 The Court stated, “Nor is it suggested that news gathering
does not qualify for First Amendment protection; without some protection for
seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated.”37
Despite the encouraging language included in the Branzburg opinion, the
Court denied that the First Amendment included a special privilege for the
press or a right to free access in Houchins v. KQED, Inc.38 In Houchins, the
30. See Hayes, supra note 10, at 1114-15.
31. Andrew Robert Schein, Attorney Fees for Pro Se Plaintiffs Under the Freedom of
Information and Privacy Acts, 63 B.U. L. REV. 443, 443 (1983).
32. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
33. See id. at 680-81.
34. Id. at 682.
35. Id. at 683 (quoting Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937)).
36. Id. at 681-682.
37. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681. In Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 10 (1978), the
Court rejected the media’s argument that the dictum used in Branzburg should be applied to
provide a right of access. The Court read the dictum as providing the press with an “undoubted
right to gather news ‘from any source by means within the law,’” but that it provides no support
for the contention that the government must affirmatively supply information to the media.
Houchins, 438 U.S. at 11 (quoting Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681-82). The language and holding in
Branzburg is decidedly against the interests of the press, and therefore, the argument made by the
Court in Houchins seems to make sense. However, subsequent opinions that expanded the right
of access relied on this language to support their majority opinions that assert that the First
Amendment supports a right of access. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S.
555, 576-77, 580 (1980).
38. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 15-16. It is important to note that the decision in Houchins relied
on the interpretation of the Free Press Clause of the First Amendment. Id. at 14. In making their
argument, the press relied on the Free Press Clause of the First Amendment to gain access above
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Court approached the question of “whether the news media have a
constitutional right of access to a county jail . . . to interview inmates and make
sound recordings, films, and photographs for publication and broadcasting by
newspapers[,] radio and television.”39 KQED, an operator of television and
radio stations, requested permission to inspect and photograph the Greystone
prison facility in California.40 After prison officials refused, KQED filed suit
alleging that Houchins, the sheriff in charge of access to the facilities, had
violated the First Amendment by refusing to permit access.41 KQED
maintained that Houchins’s refusal to allow access was effectively a failure to
“provide any effective means by which the public could be informed of
conditions prevailing in the Greystone facility or learn of the prisoners’
grievances.”42
The Court held that “[n]either the First Amendment nor the Fourteenth
Amendment mandates a right of access to government information or sources
of information within the government’s control.”43 Chief Justice Burger made
an important distinction in his majority opinion between a right of access and a
First Amendment right to publish and disseminate information to the public.
Houchins affirmed the position that the Court will not limit the right of the
press to publish any information obtained in regard to the prison facility or its
prisoners;44 however, the opinion made it clear that the right to disseminate
information is far different from the right to have free access to that
information.45 The Court noted that, while the First Amendment prohibits the
government from limiting the publication of information obtained, the First
Amendment does not require the government to provide information for
publication. The Court noted, “We must not confuse what is ‘good,’
‘desirable,’ or ‘expedient’ with what is constitutionally commanded by the

and beyond that which was allowed to the general public. Later cases such as Richmond
Newspapers and Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982), rely on the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment in granting both the public and the press access to
criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575-76. The press did not
seek a right of access greater than that of the general public. Instead, the Court determined that
the press should be granted a right of access as a catalyst to the public. See id. at 572-73. The
press plays a considerable role in informing the public. Id.
39. Houchins, 438 U.S. at 3.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 3-4.
42. Id. at 4.
43. Id. at 15.
44. Houchins, 428 U.S. at 14. The Court determined that the prison facility “cannot prevent
respondents from learning about jail conditions in a variety of ways, albeit not as conveniently as
they might prefer. Respondents have a First Amendment right to receive letters from inmates
criticizing jail officials and reporting on conditions.” Id. at 15.
45. Id. at 12.
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First Amendment.”46 The ground for rejection of a right of access is founded
on the principle that the basic goal of the First Amendment is to have the
freedom to communicate and publish information.47 While the Court
acknowledged that a “special privilege” of access might be desirable, it was
not, in the Court’s eyes, essential to this freedom; therefore, it is not mandated
by the First Amendment.48 The First Amendment would not be construed to
compel the government to hand over the information for publication, but it
would preclude the government from preventing publication after its receipt.49
Following the Court’s analysis in Houchins, the media temporarily turned
their attention away from the First Amendment and chose instead to base their
argument for open access on the Sixth Amendment. The media considered the
Sixth Amendment to be a more fruitful source for those members of the media
trying to gain access to closed criminal proceedings. The Sixth Amendment
states that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial.”50 In Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, the media argued
that the Sixth Amendment literally requires judges to open pretrial criminal
proceedings to the public as well as to the press.51
In Gannett, the owner of a local newspaper challenged a court order
excluding the public and the press from a pretrial suppression hearing in a
murder case.52 The defendants requested that the court exclude members of
the press and the public from the pretrial hearing after expressing concern that
the media circus had already jeopardized their right to a fair trial and further
publicity might aggravate an intense situation.53 The Supreme Court disagreed
with the media’s interpretation of the Sixth Amendment, concluding instead
that the Sixth Amendment provides a right that is personal to the criminal
defendant.54 Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, reasoned that “[t]he
Constitution nowhere mentions any right of access to a criminal trial on the
part of the public; its guarantee, like the others enumerated, is personal to the
accused.”55 The Court explained further that the Sixth Amendment guarantees
a right of an accused to a public trial but does not guarantee that right to the
public or the press.56 The Court refused to recognize a right of access under
the Sixth Amendment, but suggested that it might revisit the question of

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id. at 13.
See id. at 12.
Id. at 11-12.
Houchins, 428 U.S. at 12.
U.S. CONST. amend VI (emphasis added).
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 391-93 (1979).
Id. at 375.
Id.
Id. at 379-80.
Id.
Gannett, 443 U.S. at 380-83.
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whether the First Amendment protects a right of access.57 The Court candidly
revealed that, “even assuming, arguendo, that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments may guarantee such access in some situations,” it did not feel
compelled to decide such a question in this particular case.58 Therefore, it was
uncertain whether the Court would consider a First Amendment right of the
press and the public to criminal proceedings in the future.
In light of the fact that the Court refused to recognize a First Amendment
right of access to hearings and governmental institutions in Houchins, it seems
odd that a year later the Court would refuse to address this seemingly settled
issue in Gannett.59 Gannett brought hope to the media—who, until this point,
had been discouraged in their pursuit of a judicially-recognized right of access
to information—that the Court would recognize such a right to access. The
question the Court left open in Gannett would be answered just a year later in
Richmond Newspapers.
B.

Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia

Following the Court’s decision in Gannett, trial judges quickly took
advantage of the decision that precluded any successful Sixth Amendment
claim of access and proceeded to close their doors to the public and the press.60
Throughout the 1970s, the Court denied any press claim that the First
Amendment required the government to provide information to the press;61
however, the Court’s purposeful oversight of the First Amendment question in
Gannett infuriated the media.62 The media found their answer when the Court
supported a First Amendment right of access to criminal trials in Richmond
Newspapers.63 “[I]n one of the more remarkable and unanticipated turnabouts
on the Court, an unconsolidated majority adopted a variation of the so-called
structural theory to recognize for the first time a First Amendment-based
affirmative right of public access to criminal trial proceedings.”64 The basis of
all future decisions expanding the right of access to government proceedings is

57. See id. at 392.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Olson, supra note 10, at 475-76.
61. Eugene Cerruti, “Dancing in the Courthouse:” The First Amendment Right of Access
Opens a New Round, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 237, 238 (1995).
62. See Olson, supra note 10 at 475; Beth Hornbuckle Fleming, Comment, First Amendment
Right of Access to Pretrial Proceedings in Criminal Cases, 32 EMORY L.J. 619, 621 (1983).
63. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 577 (1980).
64. Cerruti, supra note 61, at 238.
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founded in the structure and language of the Court’s decision in Richmond
Newspapers.65
The Court initially intended to answer the “narrow question . . . [of]
whether the right of the public and press to attend criminal trials is guaranteed
under the United States Constitution.”66 In the end, the Court would establish
the foundation for the current state of public access to government information.
The groundbreaking decision of Richmond Newspapers began in the context of
a highly-publicized murder trial in Virginia.67 Before the defendant’s fourth
trial for the same count, counsel for the defendant requested that the trial judge
close the hearing to the public and the press amidst fears that members of the
jury as well as potential witnesses were unfairly influenced by the media
attention.68 The trial judge relied on a Virginia statute that gave him the power
to close the courtroom to the press and the public absent any objections from
either party.69 Several newspapers, including Richmond Newspapers, Inc.,
objected to the order closing the hearing.70 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari in the case of Richmond Newspapers after the Supreme Court of
Virginia refused to hear the case.71
Although the Court was in general agreement that the First Amendment
provided a right of access for the press and the public, the Justices disagreed as
to the scope and the significance of that right.72 Only eight Justices participated

65. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise Co. v. Sup. Ct., 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (Press-Enterprise II); PressEnterprise Co. v. Sup. Ct., 464 U.S. 501 (1984) (Press-Enterprise I); Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Sup. Ct, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
66. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 558.
67. Id. at 559.
68. Id. at 559-60.
69. Id. at 560. The trial judge was presumably referring to VA. CODE ANN. §19.2-266
(Supp. 1980), which states:
In the trial of all criminal cases, whether the same be felony or misdemeanor cases, the
court may, in its discretion, exclude from the trial any persons whose presence would
impair the conduct of a fair trial, provided that the right of the accused to a public trial
shall not be violated.
VA. CODE ANN. §19.2-266. It is interesting to note that the Court did not decide whether or not
the Virginia Code upon which the trial judge relied was in and of itself unconstitutional.
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 562 n.4. The Court maintained that the validity of the code
“was not sufficiently drawn in question by appellants before the Virginia courts to invoke our
appellate jurisdiction.” Id.
70. Id. at 560.
71. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 562-63.
72. See id. The Court was in general agreement despite a dissenting opinion written by
Justice Rehnquist and multiple concurring opinions. A majority of justices agreed that the press
and the public should have access to the hearing, but some justices thought that the right should
originate in the Sixth rather than the First Amendment. See id.
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in the case,73 but the Court produced six separate opinions, each offering an
independent rationale concerning the nature and scope of the First Amendment
right of access. The two most notable opinions come from Justice Burger and
Justice Brennan.74 Both opinions are valuable and significant in terms of
future Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding a First Amendment right of
access to government information. While Justice Burger’s opinion was the
plurality opinion in Richmond Newspapers, Justice Brennan’s concurring
opinion proved to be more resilient in subsequent cases.
Justice Burger chose to decide the very narrow question of the press’s right
of access to criminal trials under the First Amendment.75 Justice Burger
considered the question presented in Richmond Newspapers as one of first
impression for the Court, noting that the cases of Gannett and Houchins were
factually distinguishable because Richmond Newspapers was limited to the
First Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings.76 The plurality of
the Court held that “the right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the
guarantees of the First Amendment; without the freedom to attend such trials,
which people have exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of
speech and ‘of the press could be eviscerated.’”77 This holding is primarily
based on both the extensive history of public access to criminal trials as well as
the people’s right to gain information regarding the functioning of their
government.78
Justice Burger placed primary emphasis on the long and continuous history
He stated,
of public and media access to criminal proceedings.79
“[T]hroughout its evolution, the trial has been open to all who care to
observe.”80 The First Amendment was enacted with this history of openness in
mind.81 Open criminal trials are essential to ensuring that criminal
“proceedings [are] conducted fairly to all concerned, [and to] . . . discourage[]

73. Justice Powell did not participate in the consideration or the decision in this case. Id. at
581. Although Justice Powell did not participate in this particular decision, he undoubtedly
supported a right of access under the First Amendment. In both Gannett, Co. v. DePasquale, 444
U.S. 368, 397 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring), and Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 19 (1978)
(Powell, J., dissenting), Powell supported a finding for a right of access to information from
judicial proceedings. In fact, of the eight remaining Justices who sat for the Richmond
Newspapers case, only Justice Rehnquist disagreed with the majority that the First Amendment
provided a right of access to criminal trials. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 604.
74. Justice Marshall joined Justice Brennan in his well-written concurring opinion. Id. at
584.
75. Id. at 558.
76. Id. at 563-64.
77. Id. at 580 (footnote omitted) (quoting Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972)).
78. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575.
79. Id. at 575.
80. Id. at 564.
81. Id. at 575.
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perjury, the misconduct of participants, and decisions based on secret bias or
partiality.”82 Additionally, open criminal trials provide therapeutic value to a
community as a method of dealing with those who committed criminal acts.83
Justice Burger noted:
People in an open society do not demand infallibility from their institutions,
but it is difficult for them to accept what they are prohibited from observing.
When a criminal trial is conducted in the open, there is at least an opportunity
both for understanding the system in general and its workings in a particular
case . . . .84

In light of the positive historical background of open criminal trials, Justice
Burger explained, presumptive openness is inherent and necessary to the
American system of justice.85
The First Amendment prohibits the government from “abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the [g]overnment for a redress of grievances.”86
According to Justice Burger, the freedoms expressly guaranteed in the First
Amendment “share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of
communication on matters relating to the functioning of government.”87
Essentially, the Court indicated that it is necessary to allow people to gain
access to information in order to protect their right to free speech. Because of
the long, uninterrupted history of access to trials, it is clear that criminal trials,
especially the manner in which they are conducted, are an important aspect of
the functioning of government.88 “In guaranteeing freedoms such as those of
speech and press, the First Amendment can be read as protecting the right of
everyone to attend trials so as to give meaning to those explicit guarantees.”89
The public’s right of access, in Justice Burger’s opinion, should also extend to
the press because people gain most of their information through the media.90
Denying access to the press would inhibit the people from exercising their First
Amendment rights because they would be unable to gain information about
their government. It is clear that the history of the openness of criminal trials
was the defining factor in Justice Burger’s analysis.91

82. Id. at 569.
83. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 571.
84. Id. at 572.
85. Id. at 573.
86. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
87. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 577 n.12.
91. Olson, supra note 10, at 477-78. Compare Globe Newspaper Co. v. Sup. Ct., 457 U.S.
596, 613 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that, based on historical evidence, criminal
trials for sexual offenses involving victims who are minors are traditionally closed) with
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While Justice Burger’s historical analysis is important to future Supreme
Court jurisprudence regarding the right of access under the First Amendment,
Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion in Richmond Newspapers proved to be
the more resilient.92 Unlike Justice Burger, Justice Brennan advocated a more
expansive view of the First Amendment right of access and chose not to
narrow that right to criminal cases.93 Justice Brennan asserted that the First
Amendment plays a structural role in our society and is therefore an essential
support of our republican system of government.94 “Implicit in this structural
role is not only ‘the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, but also the antecedent assumption that
valuable public debate—as well as other civic behavior—must be
informed.’”95 Essentially, Justice Brennan argued that the First Amendment
must support the conditions that would lead to informed public debate in order
to fulfill its structural role in the Constitution.96 This line of reasoning
supports open access to information to educate the public and foster informed
public debate.
Justice Brennan acknowledged that an interpretation of the First
Amendment along these lines would allow people to have access to a
seemingly endless amount of government information.97 He argued that “‘the
stretch of this protection is theoretically endless’ [so] it must be invoked with
discrimination and temperance.”98 Justice Brennan formulated a two-pronged
“experience and logic” test as a practical limit to this structural principle.99 A
history, or “experience,” of public access to a particular proceeding is vital
because:
[T]he case for a right of access has special force when drawn from an enduring
and vital tradition of public entree to particular proceedings or information.
Such a tradition commands respect in part because the Constitution carries the
gloss of history. More importantly, a tradition of accessibility implies the
favorable judgment of experience.100

Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575-80 (basing approval of First Amendment access to
criminal trials on an uncontradicted common law history of access to proceedings).
92. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 604-06. Justice Brennan, writing for the
majority, formalized his structural interpretation of the First Amendment as well as his two-part
“experience and logic” test. Id. He consistently cited to his concurring opinion in Richmond
Newspapers. Id.
93. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 586.
94. Id. at 587.
95. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
96. See id. at 587-88.
97. Id. at 588.
98. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 588 (citation omitted) (quoting William Brennan,
Address, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 173, 177 (1979)).
99. Id. at 589.
100. Id.
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If the First Amendment is to fulfill its structural role in providing the public
with circumstances that support informed public debate, it seems clear that a
favorable history of access would lend itself to that ideal. The second, or
“logic,” prong of the test is essential to limit access because practical
considerations must be taken into account in each case before granting a right
of access.101 It is important to analyze the specific benefits gained from access
to the proceeding in question.102 “[W]hat is crucial [to the logic portion of the
two-pronged analysis] in individual cases is whether access to a particular
government process is important in terms of that very process.”103 With those
words, Justice Brennan laid the foundation in support of a First Amendment
right of access for subsequent right of access cases.
C. Richmond Newspapers Gains New Ground: The Expansion of the Right of
Access and the Addition of Strict Scrutiny
Two years after Richmond Newspapers, the Court decided its next right of
access case, Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court.104 Writing for the
majority, Justice Brennan declared unconstitutional a Massachusetts law
requiring judges to close the courtroom doors to the press and the public during
the testimony of minor victims of sex offenses.105 In Globe Newspaper,
Justice Brennan relied on his structural theory of the First Amendment from
Richmond Newspapers as the source of the right of access. He cited the
Richmond Newspapers plurality for the proposition that “the ‘expressly
guaranteed freedoms’ of the First Amendment ‘share a common core purpose
of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of
government.’”106 Justice Brennan then declared, “Thus to the extent that the
First Amendment embraces a right of access to criminal trials, it is to ensure
that this constitutionally protected ‘discussion of governmental affairs’ is an
informed one.”107
As noted in Richmond Newspapers, a right of access supported by a
structural theory of the First Amendment could be seemingly endless.108
Therefore, Justice Brennan returned to his two limiting principles, experience
and logic, as practical limitations on that right.109 Justice Brennan, in writing
for the majority, clearly stated that First Amendment access to criminal trials

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

Id.
Id.
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring).
457 U.S. 596 (1982).
Id. at 610-11.
Id. at 604 (quoting Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575).
Id. at 604-05.
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 588 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606.
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does not depend on the context in which each particular case arises.110 For
example, the fact that the criminal case in Globe Newspaper involved a minor
sex-crime victim was not important to the First Amendment analysis.111
Rather, a First Amendment right of access exists only if the experience and
logic analysis lends favorably to open access on a case-by-case basis.112
Justice Brennan used historical evidence articulated in Richmond Newspapers
to conclude that criminal trials have traditionally been open to the public.113
Second, the Court concluded that the logic prong lends favorably to open
proceedings because “the right of access to criminal trials plays a particularly
significant role in the function[] of the judicial process and the government as a
whole.”114 Therefore, Justice Brennan reaffirmed the application of the
experience and logic analysis to determine that the media has a right of access
to deportation proceedings.
The groundbreaking aspect of Globe Newspaper is the addition of the
“strict scrutiny” portion of the analysis.115 Although a court may determine
that a fundamental right of access exists under the First Amendment, the right
is not limitless.116 The government may still restrict access if the restriction
passes the Court’s strict scrutiny analysis. The Court held that “it must be
shown that the denial is necessitated by a compelling government interest and
is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”117 In Globe Newspaper, although
the state’s interest in protecting minor victims of sex offenses was compelling,
the Court determined that the mandatory closure rule was not narrowly tailored
to serve that interest.118 The Court found blanket closures to be unnecessary
because one could restrict access in a more narrow fashion by deciding on a
case-by-case basis whether to close a particular hearing.119
Globe Newspaper is exceedingly important because it offered lower courts
guidance in how they should weigh competing interests in right of access
cases. “[A]fter Globe [Newspapers], many lower courts began using
‘tradition’ and ‘contribution to function’ as a two-pronged standard for
determining whether there was a right of access to government proceedings or
information.”120 The decision also established a strict scrutiny standard in
order to assess government restrictions on access to information and

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id. at 605 n.13.
Id.
Id. at 608-09.
Id. at 605.
Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606.
Id. at 606-07.
Id. at 606.
Id. at 607.
Id. at 607-08.
Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 608.
Hayes, supra note 10, at 1118.
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proceedings that are protected by the First Amendment.121 Therefore, the
Globe Newspaper decision did much to refine the standard originally set forth
in Richmond Newspapers. While relying on the reasoning set forth in his
concurrence in Richmond Newspapers, Justice Brennan gained a majority and
redefined the existing confines of the right of access to government
proceedings and information.
Two years later, in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (PressEnterprise I), the Court found a First Amendment right of access to pretrial
jury selection proceedings in a criminal case.122 Press-Enterprise I involved a
challenge to a trial judge’s order to seal the transcript of jury selection
proceedings in a criminal trial.123 Although the case took place in the criminal
context, this was the first time that the Court chose to extend the right of access
outside the context of a criminal trial.124 Despite the fact that the case involved
a pre-trial jury selection proceeding rather than an actual criminal trial, the
Court applied the two-prong Richmond Newspapers standard rather than
Houchins.125 The majority opinion notably did not include a discussion on the
constitutional source of a right of access.126 Assuming that Richmond
Newspapers and Globe Newspaper had sufficiently established the existence of
a First Amendment right of access, the Court turned directly to the experience
and logic inquiry to determine if the right existed in the case of pretrial jury
selection proceedings.127 The Court articulated a history of access to pretrial
jury selection dating back to the English common law and concluded that the
long, continuous history of access to pretrial jury selection offered values
similar to those present in a criminal trial.128 An open pretrial proceeding
offered “community therapeutic value” and an assurance that the government
was functioning properly.129
After determining that the experience and logic portion of the test had been
satisfied, the Court determined that the trial judge’s order was not narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling interest.130 The Court also required that the
proponent of the restriction provide specific, particularized findings supporting
the narrow-tailoring requirement.131 Although the government interest in
closure was compelling in this case, the Court held that the trial judge’s broad

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. at 1118-19.
Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 513 (1984).
Id. at 504-05.
Hayes, supra note 10, at 1119.
Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 509-10.
See id. at 503.
Id. at 505-08.
Id.
Id. at 508-09.
Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 513.
Id. at 510.
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order closing the transcript was not narrowly tailored to serve that interest.132
The trial judge had failed to articulate specific findings to prove that the
closure was narrowly tailored and also failed to consider alternatives to
closure.133 Press-Enterprise I indicated that the Court would take great care to
protect First Amendment rights when they are found to exist and demonstrated
the Court’s willingness to apply the Richmond Newspapers standard outside
the context of a criminal trial.
D. The Current State of the Right of Access
After the decision in Press-Enterprise I, the Court heard only one more
case involving the right of access under the First Amendment. In PressEnterprise Co. v. Superior Court (Press Enterprise II), the Court held that the
press and the public had a right to attend preliminary hearings in criminal
cases.134 The case involved a challenge to an order closing transcripts of
pretrial proceedings in highly-publicized cases.135 Despite the trial judge’s
conclusion that much of the material included in the transcript was historical,
the trial court concluded that the release of the transcript could jeopardize the
defendant’s right to a fair trial.136 The media filed a challenge to the order in
state court, claiming that the closure was a violation of their First Amendment
rights.137
The Court applied the Richmond Newspapers standard to determine
whether or not the First Amendment protected access to transcripts of
preliminary hearings in criminal cases.138 First, the Court determined that the
history of access to preliminary hearings satisfied the experience portion of the
test.139 The significance of the Press Enterprise II opinion is its reliance on
post-Bill of Rights history to support the experience portion of the Richmond
Newspapers standard. Previous Supreme Court cases that dealt with the
experience portion of the two-prong test had articulated historical evidence of
openness dating back to English common law.140 The Supreme Court had not
yet articulated specific guidelines concerning the extent of history necessary to
pass the experience portion of the test. If a proceeding lacked an extensive
history of openness, it was uncertain whether the Court would consider the

132. Id. at 513.
133. Id.
134. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 15 (1986).
135. Id. at 5.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 8.
139. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8-11.
140. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Sup. Ct., 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (providing a history of
openness to criminal proceedings dating back to the Norman Conquest); Richmond Newspapers,
Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (same).
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experience sufficient. Press-Enterprise II suggested that a history of openness
dating back to English common law was unnecessary when the Court relied
upon nineteenth and twentieth century history to satisfy the experience portion
of the test.141 Following this decision, many believed that the history need not
be as extensive as the history described in Richmond Newspapers.142 Next, the
Court concluded that the logic portion of the two-prong test had been satisfied
because the traditional access to preliminary proceedings in criminal cases has
had a positive effect on pretrial proceedings by acting as a safeguard against
overzealous prosecution and providing an outlet for public observation.143
After determining that both portions of the experience and logic test had been
satisfied, the Court determined that the order failed under strict scrutiny.144
Specifically, the Court concluded that the trial court failed to articulate valid
reasons for closing the transcript.145 The Court noted, “The First Amendment
right of access cannot be overcome by the conclusory assertion that publicity
might deprive the defendant of that right.”146
Following Press-Enterprise II, it became clear that a reviewing court must
first determine whether the particular proceeding passes the experience and
logic test articulated in Richmond Newspapers. If the reviewing court
determines that the proceeding in question does not pass the experience and
logic test, then the First Amendment does not support a right of access in that
particular proceeding.147 If, alternatively, the reviewing court determines that
the proceeding does pass the experience and logic test, the public and the press
will enjoy a qualified right of access to that particular proceeding. The
government might still restrict access to a proceeding if it has a compelling
reason and the limitation is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.148
Although Press-Enterprise II provided a definitive procedure by which
right of access cases are to be determined, the Court’s right of access cases left
many open questions for the lower courts to consider. First, the Court never
explicitly overruled the decision in Houchins.149 Decisions following

141. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 10-11.
142. See, e.g., Olson, supra note 10, at 485-86.
143. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 12-13.
144. Id. at 13-15.
145. Id. at 14-15.
146. Id. at 15.
147. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 589 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
148. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 13-14.
149. There is some evidence that the Court still considers Houchins to be good law. Los
Angeles Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999), dealt with the
constitutionality of a California statute that regulates the circumstances under which a publisher
can obtain information. The press argued that the law violated the First Amendment because it
limited access to government information. Id. at 34. The Court stated, “California could decide
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Houchins failed to provide any guidance as to how to resolve the inconsistency
in Supreme Court precedent.150 Therefore, lower courts have struggled with
the application of Richmond Newspapers and Houchins.151 Second, “[t]he
Court’s ambiguity about the relative importance of the two prongs and its lack
of guidance regarding the extent of the right or its application to proceedings
beyond criminal trials has led to an inconsistent application of the doctrine.”152
The ambiguous nature of the two-part test is evidenced by the recent debate
regarding access to deportation proceedings.
III. THE CIRCUITS SPLIT: DETROIT FREE PRESS V. ASHCROFT AND NORTH JERSEY
MEDIA GROUP, INC. V. ASHCROFT
Following September 11, 2001, the United States government was forced
to take a fresh look at immigration and national security. After only a few
months, the government had arrested hundreds of foreign-born nationals on
immigration charges.153 The government was fearful that certain aliens
“‘might have connections with, or possess information pertaining to, terrorist
activities against the United States.’”154 Fearful that the deportation hearings
would be used to reveal information regarding the investigation of the
September 11 attacks as well as information regarding national security
measures, the Attorney General argued that these hearings should be closed in
“special interest” cases.155 Pursuant to the order issued by the Attorney
General, Judge Michael Creppy issued the Creppy Directive, ordering the
broad closure of hundreds of special interest immigration hearings taking place
throughout the United States.156 Under this directive, Judge Creppy excluded
not to give out arrestee information at all without violating the First Amendment.” Id. at 40. The
Court used Houchins to support this proposition. Id.
150. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1; Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501 (1984); Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Sup. Ct., 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
151. See, e.g., N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002); Detroit
Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002).
152. Olson, supra note 10, at 485.
153. Cole, supra note 2, at 961.
154. N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 202 (quoting statement of Dale L. Watson, Federal
Bureau of Investigation Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism and
Counterintelligence).
155. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 705.
156. Cohen, supra note 3, at 1442. In fact, the Attorney General, in cooperation with the
Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, closed every deportation hearing that posed even the
slightest potential national security concern in connection with the September 11 attacks. N.
Jersey Media Group, 303 F.3d at 202-03. These cases were closed to the public to keep our
enemies from becoming aware of the cases that were closed. Id. at 203. By closing unrelated
cases, Ashcroft determined that our enemies would be unable to deduce who was being deported
in a closed hearing. Id. In North Jersey Media Group, Judge Becker went into great detail
regarding the authority of, and the sources of authority for, the Creppy Directive. The Third
Circuit stated:
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the release of information concerning the trial and closed the doors to the
public in hearings for special interest detainees.157
Several newspapers came forward shortly following the Creppy Directive
claiming that the First Amendment protected access to deportation
proceedings. Two cases reached the federal appellate level in both the Sixth
and Third Circuits.
While both Circuits determined that Richmond
Newspapers was the appropriate analysis, the circuits disagreed as to whether
or not the First Amendment protected access to deportation proceedings.
Judge Keith, writing the majority opinion in Detroit Free Press, announced,
“The Executive Branch seeks to uproot people’s lives, outside the public eye,
and behind a closed door. Democracies die behind closed doors.”158 Judge
Becker, writing the opinion in North Jersey Media Group, declared, “We are
keenly aware of the dangers presented by deference to the executive branch
when constitutional liberties are at stake, especially in times of national
crisis.”159 However, Judge Becker disagreed with Judge Keith, concluding that
“[o]n balance, . . . we are unable to conclude that openness plays a positive role
in special interest deportation hearings at a time when our nation is faced with
threats of such profound and unknown dimension.”160 It is clear that fear of
terrorism and national security concerns were key to Judge Becker’s support of
the Creppy Directive in North Jersey Media Group. While concern for the
national security of our country is understandable and important, Supreme
Court jurisprudence regarding the right of access clearly does not support a
denial of First Amendment protection.

The Immigration and Nationality Act charges the Attorney General with the
“administration and enforcement” of “all [ ] laws relating to the immigration and
nationalization of aliens.” The Act authorizes the Attorney General to remove aliens from
the United States for various reasons, including violation of the immigration laws. It also
permits him to prescribe “such regulations . . . as he deems necessary for carrying out his
authority,” and provides for removal proceedings to be conducted by immigration judges
within the Executive Branch “under regulations prescribed by the Attorney General.”
Pursuant to this authority, the Attorney General in 1964 promulgated a regulation
governing public access to removal and other administrative hearings that has remained
substantially unchanged. It mandates the closure of certain hearings, such as those
involving abused alien children, and permits the closure of all other hearings to protect
“witnesses, parties, or the public interest.” The Creppy Directive was issued pursuant to
this regulation.
N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 202 n.1 (citations omitted) (quoting 8 U.S.C. §§ 1103(a),
1231 (1994) and 8 C.F.R. § 3.27 (2002)).
157. Susan Sachs, Ashcroft Petitions Justices For Secrecy in Deportations, N.Y. TIMES, June
22, 2002, at A9.
158. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 683.
159. N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 220.
160. Id.
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A. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft
Several local newspapers and members of the public were denied access to
Rabih Haddad’s deportation hearings after Immigration Judge Elizabeth
Hacker announced the closure of the hearing.161 Haddad, several newspapers
and Congressman John Conyers (collectively known as “the newspapers”)
filed complaints for injunctive and declaratory relief claiming that the Creppy
Directive’s blanket closure of all deportation proceedings in special interest
cases violated the First Amendment.162 The District Court granted the
newspapers’ motion, finding that the First Amendment protected access to
deportation proceedings.163 The court found a qualified First Amendment right
based on an application of the Richmond Newspapers standard and held that
the Creppy Directive unduly restricted protected access because it was not
narrowly tailored to serve the interests of national security.164
1.

Applicability of Richmond Newspapers

The government considered the fact that the Supreme Court failed to
overturn its decision in Houchins as an opportunity to argue before the Court
of Appeals against application of the Richmond Newspapers standard.165 The
Attorney General argued that the Richmond Newspapers standard should not
extend to deportation hearings because they are entirely administrative in
nature.166 In the government’s view, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
conferring a right of access had been limited to judicial proceedings.167 In
rejecting this argument, Judge Keith found that, although they might be
administrative, deportation hearings have quasi-judicial characteristics.168
There is ample evidence that the Supreme Court will look to the
adjudicative aspects of a particular administrative proceeding in reaching its

161. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 684.
162. Id.
163. See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 195 F. Supp. 2d 937, 944 (E.D. Mich. 2002).
164. Id. at 947.
165. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 694.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. Judge Keith, writing for the Sixth Circuit, pointed out that Houchins might no longer
be a viable standard. First, the decision in Houchins was not a majority, but rather a plurality,
decision for the Court. Id. Only seven of the nine justices took part in the decision, and therefore
it cannot be said that a majority either accepted or rejected the standard articulated in Houchins.
Id. at 694 n.10. Furthermore, the standard articulated in Richmond Newspapers has sufficiently
addressed all of the concerns stated in Houchins regarding a First Amendment right of access. Id.
at 695. Judge Keith argued against the viability of Houchins despite the Supreme Court’s prior
reliance on the case. Id. However, Judge Keith maintained that Houchins might correctly be
applied in other cases based on different facts and circumstances. Id. at 694-95.
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decisions regarding administrative proceedings.169 For instance, the Sixth
Circuit cited the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Sims v. Apfel170 and
Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority171 in
support of this proposition.172 In Sims, the Supreme Court held that a social
security recipient need not exhaust all issues at the administrative hearing to
preserve them for judicial review.173 In the Court’s view, proceedings before
an administrative agency are not adversarial in nature and therefore are not
necessarily subject to the same standards governing adversarial proceedings.174
In contrast, in Federal Maritime Commission, the Court “held that state
sovereign immunity bars an administrative agency from adjudicating
complaints filed by a private party against a non-consenting state because . . .
such administrative proceedings bore a striking resemblance to civil
litigation.”175 Therefore, the bar against suing a state under the Eleventh
Amendment was extended to administrative proceedings because the Court
found that they were very much like judicial proceedings.176 The Sixth Circuit
also cited one of its own prior cases, United States v. Miami University,177
which held “that there was no First Amendment right to access a university’s
student disciplinary board proceedings.”178 In that case, the Sixth Circuit
based its conclusion on the fact that the administrative proceedings that were at
issue in the case were not judicial in nature because they often did not embody
the traditional notions of fair play.179 “‘[S]tudent disciplinary proceedings do
not “afford the student the opportunity to secure counsel, to confront and crossexamine witnesses supporting the charge, or to call his own witnesses to verify

169. See id. at 695-96. The court rejected the idea that a line was drawn between
administrative proceedings and judicial proceedings. Id. at 695. First of all, the Supreme Court
has applied the Richmond Newspapers standard outside the context of judicial proceedings in
Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1 (1986), Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501 (1984), and Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Sup. Ct., 457 U.S. 596 (1982). See Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 695-96.
The Sixth Circuit and other federal courts have applied this standard outside the context of
judicial proceedings as well, and in some cases, the other federal courts have applied this standard
to administrative proceedings. Id. at 695. Furthermore, the court does not believe that
distinctions should be drawn between judicial and non-judicial proceedings for fear that it would
allow the legislature to “artfully craft information out of the public eye.” Id. at 696.
170. 530 U.S. 103 (2000).
171. 535 U.S. 743 (2002).
172. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 696-97.
173. Sims, 530 U.S. at 112.
174. Id. at 109-111.
175. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 697 (citing Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 535 U.S. at 756-61).
176. See id.
177. 294 F.3d 797 (6th Cir. 2002).
178. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 697 (citing Miami Univ., 294 F.3d at 824).
179. Id.
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his version of the incident.’”180 The Sixth Circuit relied on this precedent to
support the contention that Richmond Newspapers should apply to deportation
hearings because the hearings are quasi-judicial.181
The characteristics of deportation proceedings support the contention that
they are in fact quasi-judicial proceedings.182 The government must issue a
“Notice to Appear,” a charging document served to the deportee under
circumstances similar to those required for complaints in judicial
proceedings.183 Additionally, respondents in deportation proceedings may
offer affirmative defenses, have a right to habeas corpus relief, have a right to
be represented by counsel, and have a right to be present at the hearing.184
Additionally, respondents have the right to examine and object to evidence
used against them, present evidence on their own behalf, and cross-examine
witnesses presented by the government.185 The role of immigration judges
provides further evidence of the judicial nature of deportation proceedings.
Although immigration judges are not Article III judges,186 the role that they
play in presiding over immigration hearings is very similar to the way in which
Article III judges preside over criminal and civil proceedings. Most
importantly, the immigration judge does not participate in the investigative
aspects of the administrative proceedings; rather, the immigration judge is to
serve an impartial role in presiding over deportation proceedings.187
Deportation proceedings are adjudicative, quasi-judicial proceedings and
should be afforded First Amendment protection.
2.

Application of the Two-Pronged Richmond Newspapers Test

The right of access under the First Amendment is a qualified right that is
limited by practical considerations of experience and logic.188 Relying on
Richmond Newspapers, the central question in both North Jersey Media Group
and Detroit Free Press is therefore whether or not deportation hearings carry a

180. Id. (quoting Miami Univ., 294 F.3d at 822 (quoting Gross v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583
(1975))).
181. See id. at 698.
182. Id.
183. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 698.
184. Id. at 698-99.
185. Id. at 699.
186. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. In addition to granting Congress the power to create lower
federal courts, Article III of the United States Constitution creates the Supreme Court of the
United States. Id. Article III judges are appointed to life terms under the obligations of that
article of the Constitution. Id. Immigration judges are appointed by the Executive Branch, but do
not preside over a federal court created by Congress; instead, they preside over an administrative
agency hearing. See Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 699.
187. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 699.
188. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 588-89 (1980).
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“tradition of accessibility” and whether that tradition has had a favorable
impact on society.189
a.

The Experience Prong

In Detroit Free Press, the court concluded that there is a presumptive right
of access under the experience and logic test.190 Richmond Newspapers
requires a reviewing court to consider whether openness has proven to be a
favorable experience.191 Therefore, Judge Keith considered “‘whether the
place and process have historically been open to the press and general
public.’”192 The newspapers arguing in support of access maintained that
deportation proceedings had enjoyed a long, uncontradicted history of open
access.193 The government attacked the newspapers’ argument that deportation
hearings have been presumptively open.194 Specifically, the government
argued: (1) that the history of openness of deportation hearings must date back
to the common law tradition, and (2) that even if the court decided that the
history of openness need not date back to the common law, deportation
proceedings have not enjoyed the unambiguous presumption of openness
necessary to satisfy Richmond Newspapers.195
The government argued that Richmond Newspapers requires a common
law history of openness in order to satisfy the historical prong of the
experience test.196 Judge Keith relied on Press Enterprise II and concluded
that common law history was unnecessary.197 “[A]lthough historical context is
189. See N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002); Detroit Free
Press, 303 F.3d 681. This is often referred to as the experience and logic test. See Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Sup. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982). The government in both Detroit Free
Press and North Jersey Media Group argued that the federal government should receive great
deference in control over its borders. See N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 202; Detroit Free
Press, 303 F.3d at 685-87. More specifically, the Court has declared that “[i]mmigration includes
substantive laws over who may enter or remain in this country, laws governing procedural aspects
of immigration hearings, and regulations on the mechanics of deportation.” Detroit Free Press,
303 F.3d at 686-687. As indicated in the case of Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001),
throughout its jurisprudence in the area of immigration, the Supreme Court has treated the
authority that Congress holds differently with regard to procedural laws than it does with regard
to substantive laws. “The Supreme Court has always interpreted the Constitution meaningfully to
limit non-substantive immigration laws, without granting the Government special deference.”
Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 687-688. Therefore, the court in Detroit Free Press refused to
defer to the Attorney General’s discretion regarding our national borders. Id. at 688.
190. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 700.
191. See Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 588 (Brennan, J., concurring).
192. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 700 (quoting Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 8 (1986)).
193. See id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 700-704.
196. Id. at 700.
197. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 700.
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important, a brief historical tradition might be sufficient to establish a First
Amendment right of access where the beneficial effects of access to that
process are overwhelming and uncontradicted.”198 Although deportation
hearings lack a common law tradition of openness, the court held the history of
openness sufficient to satisfy the experience prong of the Richmond
Newspapers test.199
Next, Judge Keith turned his attention to the history of openness in
deportation proceedings. The general policy toward deportation proceedings
has traditionally been one of openness.200 Administrative proceedings have
evolved to embrace open hearings in most cases and particularly in the case of
deportation hearings.201 He noted that “[s]ince 1965, INS regulations have
explicitly required deportation proceedings to be presumptively open.”202
Congress has repeatedly enacted statutes that explicitly close exclusion
hearings, but leave deportation proceedings open.203 The government argued
that the closure of exclusion hearings and the openness of deportation
proceedings indicated that Congress sought to give the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) discretion over closure of deportation hearings.204
Judge Keith disagreed, stating that “it would have been easy enough for
Congress expressly to state that the Attorney General had such discretion with
respect to deportation hearings. But it did not.”205 The Immigration and
Nationality Act is full of examples that specifically grant the Attorney General
discretion.206 It is clear that in choosing not to grant the Attorney General the
right to close deportation hearings to the public, Congress concluded that the
hearings should be open to the public.207 Judge Keith reasoned that a history
of openness that dates back to the creation of the deportation proceeding
satisfied the Richmond Newspapers’ experience prong of the test.208
b.

The Logic Prong

When looking at the substantive question of whether or not access to
deportation proceedings plays a positive role, the Sixth and the Third Circuits
disagree as to the appropriate outcome. Judge Keith concluded that public

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id. at 701.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 701.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 702.
Id.
Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 702.
Id. at 700-03.
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access to deportation proceedings has had a positive effect.209 He stated,
“First, public access acts as a check on the actions of the Executive by assuring
us that proceedings are conducted fairly and properly.”210 In light of the
unlimited authority that the government does exercise in relation to deportation
hearings, public access must act as a check to any abusive government
practice.211 Second, public access will ensure that government “does its job
properly.”212 Openness and public access will prevent mistakes and ensure
that the government acts formally and carefully in order to prevent public
disapproval.213 It is likely that public access would work to ensure the proper
execution of this country’s immigration laws and deportation proceedings.214
Third, openness of deportation proceedings is necessary for “therapeutic”
purposes, as an outlet for community concerns, hostility and emotions,
especially after September 11, 2001.215 Judge Keith further stated that
“openness enhances the perception of integrity and fairness. ‘The value of
openness lies in the fact that people not actually attending trials can have
confidence that standards of fairness are being observed . . . .’”216 Finally, he
noted that “public access helps ensure that ‘the individual citizen can
effectively participate in and contribute to our republican system of selfgovernment.’”217 Access to deportation proceedings informs the public of the
government’s actions directly.218 “Direct knowledge of how . . . government is
operating enhances the public’s ability to affirm or protest government’s
efforts. . . . When government selectively chooses what information it allows
the public to see, it can become a powerful tool for deception.”219 After
evaluating the considerable evidence of the positive impact of access, the court
concluded that the logic portion of the inquiry was satisfied.220
Application of the Richmond Newspapers standard to deportation
proceedings led Judge Keith to conclude that deportation proceedings enjoy
qualified First Amendment protection.221 While the First Amendment will
now provide protection for members of the public seeking access to a
deportation proceeding, this right is not absolute. The government may still
209. Id. at 703.
210. Id. at 703-04.
211. Id. at 704.
212. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 704.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. (quoting Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S., 501, 508 (1984)).
217. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 704 (quoting Globe Newspaper Co. v. Sup. Ct., 457 U.S.
596, 604 (1982)).
218. Id. at 704-05.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 705.
221. Id.
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restrict access to protected information if the limitation passes the strict
scrutiny analysis.
B.

Application of the Strict Scrutiny Standard in the Sixth Circuit

Under the applicable strict scrutiny analysis, when access to information is
protected by the First Amendment, the government may not restrict that access
unless there is a compelling state interest and the restriction is narrowly
tailored to serve that interest.222 Additionally, Supreme Court jurisprudence
demands that any compelling government interest be “‘articulated along with
findings specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the
closure order was properly entered.’”223 In order for any restriction on the
right of access to pass scrutiny, both of these prongs must be satisfied.224
Judge Keith determined that, although the government interest in national
security is compelling, the Creppy Directive was not narrowly tailored to serve
national security interests; further, the government had not provided any
particularized findings to that end.225
1.

A Compelling Government Interest

The government argued that the “‘[c]losure of removal proceedings in
special interest cases is necessary to protect national security by safeguarding
the Government’s investigation of the September 11 terrorist attack and other
terrorist conspiracies.’”226 More specifically, the government stated that any
information including the names of the special interest detainees as well as the
place and date of arrest satisfies the compelling government interest
requirement.227 Public disclosure could cause any ongoing investigation to be
disrupted because such disclosure would alert terrorist organizations of the
arrests.228 This could lead to intimidation of potential witnesses and might
deter the detainees from cooperating, both of which would hamper the
government’s investigation.229 Furthermore, public access could reveal the
direction of the investigation or could invite terrorist organizations to interfere
with pending proceedings by creating false evidence intended to mislead the
government.230 If public access were allowed in deportation hearings in
special cases, “‘[b]its and pieces of information that may appear innocuous in
isolation,’ but used by terrorist groups to help form a ‘bigger picture’ of the
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 705 (citing Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606-07).
Id. (quoting Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 10 (1986)).
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting U.S. Government Brief at 46).
Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 705-06.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 706.
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Government’s terrorism investigation, would be disclosed.”231 There is an
additional fear of the stigma that the special interest detainees would
experience if their names were divulged to the public, even if they were found
not to have any connection to terrorism.232 The Sixth Circuit deferred to the
judgment of the government regarding its ongoing investigation in the realm of
terrorism.233 The Court stated, “These agents are certainly in a better position
to understand the contours of the investigation and the intelligence capabilities
of terrorist organizations.”234
2.

Narrow Tailoring

As mentioned earlier, the government must prove both a compelling
interest and narrow tailoring to pass strict scrutiny.235 Specific findings must
be produced on the record so that “a reviewing court can determine whether
closure was proper and whether less restrictive alternatives exist.”236 In
Detroit Free Press, Judge Keith noted that “[t]he Government offers no
persuasive argument as to why the Government’s concerns cannot be
addressed on a case-by-case basis.”237 He stated that in camera review before
the closure of any particular proceeding would likely provide as much security
as the Creppy Directive.238 The government had argued that sensitive
information would be revealed if the closure were limited to a case-by-case
basis.239 Essentially, the government feared that any release of information, no
matter how unimportant it might seem at the time, might give terrorist groups
some insight.240 Judge Keith contended that this information is already
capable of being released to the public by the detainees themselves, whose
speech the government is unable to restrict; therefore, he concluded, the names
of various detainees are likely to be released anyway.241 Further, the
government has a wide range of control over deportation proceedings and need
only release very little information in order to prove its case.242 Despite the
government’s substantial concerns, Judge Keith concluded that the government
failed to provide particularized findings that the Creppy Directive was

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Id. (quoting affidavit submitted in support of U.S. Government’s position).
Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 706.
Id. at 707.
Id.
Id. at 705.
Id. at 707.
Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 707.
See id. at 708.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 709.
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narrowly tailored.243 He concluded, “[W]e do not believe speculation should
form the basis for such a drastic reduction of the public’s First Amendment
rights.”244 As a result, the court upheld the District Court’s injunction on the
imposition of the Creppy Directive in Haddad’s deportation case, finding that
there is a presumptive right of openness and that the standard of strict scrutiny
had not been satisfied in this case.245
IV. NORTH JERSEY MEDIA GROUP, INC. V. ASHCROFT
Like Detroit Free Press, the dispute in North Jersey Media Group
involved a First Amendment challenge to the Creppy Directive. After the New
Jersey Law Journal and Herald News were repeatedly denied access to
information about deportation proceedings pending in Newark’s Immigration
Court, the newspapers filed an action claiming a violation of their First
Amendment rights.246 The District Court followed the two-part Richmond
Newspapers test and found that the First Amendment provides a qualified right
of access to deportation proceedings.247 The court concluded that the
presumptive right of access as well as the innumerable similarities between
judicial proceedings and deportation proceedings supported the existence of
that right.248 The District Court also determined that the Creppy Directive was
unconstitutional because it called for a blanket closure of the proceedings and
was not narrowly tailored to serve the interests of national security.249 The
government subsequently appealed the District Court’s decision, and the Third
Circuit granted expedited review of the government’s appeal but refused to
grant a stay of the District Court’s injunction.250

243. Id. at 710.
244. Id. at 709. The government contended that it has in place an interim rule that restrains
the deportees from communicating information for an “indefinite period of time.” Id. at 708.
“The interim rules provide that ‘protective orders issued under this section shall remain in effect
until vacated by the Immigration Judge.’ It also provides that ‘(a)ny information submitted
subject to the protective order . . . shall remain under seal as part of the administrative record.’”
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added by court) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 3.46(f)(3) (2002)).
However, Judge Keith contended that this type of order is completely impermissible to the extent
that it is “indefinitely restrain[ing] a deportee’s ability to divulge all information, including
information obtained independently from the deportation proceedings.” Id. This might have First
Amendment implications of its own. See id.; see also Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624 (1990).
245. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 710.
246. See N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 203-04 (3d Cir. 2002).
247. N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 205 F. Supp. 2d 288, 301 (D.N.J. 2002).
248. Id.
249. Id. at 302.
250. N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 204.
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The Richmond Newspapers Standard in the Third Circuit

Like the Sixth Circuit, the Third Circuit chose to apply the Richmond
Newspapers standard rather than that enunciated in Houchins.251 Judge Becker
concluded, “Given that a majority of the Supreme Court has applied the
Richmond Newspapers framework to pretrial proceedings and voir dire
examinations, that approach clearly is not confined to the criminal trial itself,
although each of the Supreme Court’s applications has arisen in the criminal
context.”252 Before North Jersey Media Group, the Third Circuit had
traditionally applied the Richmond Newspapers standard outside judicial
proceedings.
For instance, the Third Circuit applied the Richmond
Newspapers analysis to the question of whether there is a right of public access
to records of a state environmental agency.253 Despite the fact that the case
involved an administrative agency, the decision ultimately rested on the
Richmond Newspapers test.254 Judge Becker stated, “[I]n this Court, Richmond
Newspapers is a test broadly applicable to issues of access to government
proceedings, including removal.”255 Therefore, the Third Circuit, like the
Sixth Circuit, deemed the Richmond Newspapers standard to be the appropriate
analysis under which to determine whether access to deportation proceedings
enjoy First Amendment protection.
B.

Application of the Two-Part Richmond Newspapers Test

Unlike Judge Keith, Judge Becker determined that access is not
constitutionally protected. The court concluded that the broken, ambiguous
history of access to deportation proceedings did not satisfy the Richmond
Newspapers test.256 The court could have chosen to end its inquiry there, but
chose instead to comment on the inadequacy of the logic prong as well.257
Judge Becker stated, “We also conclude that under a logic inquiry properly
acknowledging both community benefit and potential harms, public access
does not serve a ‘significant positive role’ in deportation hearings.”258 In
finding that deportation proceedings failed on both the logic and experience
prongs of the Richmond Newspapers test, the Third Circuit unquestionably
determined that the First Amendment does not protect access to deportation
proceedings.

251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.

Id. at 208-09.
Id. at 206.
Id. at 208.
Id.
N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 208-09.
Id. at 209.
Id.
Id.
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The Experience Prong

Judge Becker concluded that the period of history necessary to satisfy the
experience prong of the Richmond Newspapers analysis is an open question to
be decided in favor of a long, uninterrupted history in cases involving
deportation proceedings.259 He stated, “The Newspapers contend, quite
correctly, that at least within the geographic confines of the Third Circuit, a
showing of openness at common law is not required.”260 Although the court
agreed that a showing of common-law history is not required, the court would
not ignore the experience portion of the Richmond Newspapers inquiry in cases
where history is “ambiguous or lacking.”261 The court noted that “[r]elaxing
the Richmond Newspapers experience requirement would lead to perverse
consequences” in deportation proceedings.262 It is the Third Circuit’s belief
that there needs to be a more rigorous experience test in order to protect
administrative agencies’ ability to promulgate their rules.263 Becker argued
that administrative agencies should be able to conduct their businesses behind
closed doors in order to insure that they operate more smoothly.264 He wrote,
“By insisting on a strong tradition of public access in the Richmond
Newspapers test, we preserve administrative flexibility and avoid
constitutionalizing ambiguous, and potentially unconsidered, executive
decisions.”265
With this in mind, Judge Becker required extensive historical evidence to
support openness in deportation proceedings.266 He noted, “While we
acknowledge a current presumption of openness in most deportation
proceedings, we find that this presumption has neither the pedigree nor
uniformity necessary to satisfy the Richmond Newspapers’s first prong.”267
The Third Circuit found that there is extensive and compelling evidence that
the Framers rejected an unqualified right of access to the functions of the
political branches.268 First, the court noted that the first Congress did not open
its proceedings and floor hearings to the public.269 Even today the majority of
Congressional activity takes place behind closed doors.270 As a second
example of a closed administrative proceeding, the court stated that, because of

259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

Id. at 216.
N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 213.
Id.
Id. at 215.
Id. at 216.
Id.
N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 216.
Id. at 214.
Id. at 209.
Id.
Id. at 209-10.
N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 210.
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the sensitive information released during the process, social security
proceedings are closed to the public regardless of the impact.271 The
government provided examples of more then a dozen administrative
proceedings that are presumptively closed to the public.272
The Third Circuit disagreed with the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion that
deportation proceedings have traditionally been open to the public and press.273
The court stated, “[B]ased on both Supreme Court and Third Circuit
precedents, the tradition of open deportation hearings is too recent and
inconsistent to support a First Amendment right of access.”274 The court
rejected the newspaper’s argument that Congress’s practice of closing
exclusion proceedings while refraining from closing deportation proceedings
indicated that Congress intended that these proceedings remain presumptively
open to the public.275 The court asserted that there is evidence to indicate
specifically that deportation proceedings have been closed to the public.276
The government had often held deportation proceedings in areas that are
traditionally closed off to the public such as prisons, hospitals, and even
private homes.277 Hearings involving abused alien children are closed to the
public by regulation.278 The Third Circuit concluded that without the “gloss of
history” gained only by an extensive history of access, deportation proceedings
were unable to satisfy the experience portion of the Richmond Newspapers
test.279 Furthermore, the Third Circuit maintained that historical access to
deportation proceedings did not lend itself to the favorable judgment of
experience.280 In light of this evidence, Judge Becker concluded that the
experience portion of the Richmond Newspapers standard had failed in the
context of deportation proceedings.
2.

The Logic Prong

The Third Circuit considered the logic prong ineffective when used in the
Richmond Newspapers standard. The court noted:

271. Id.
272. See id. Deportation proceedings, in any and all forms, were notably absent from this list.
273. Id. at 211.
274. Id.
275. N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 212. “Justice Department regulations provide
explicitly that ‘[a]ll hearings, other than exclusion hearings, shall be open to the public except
that . . . [f]or the purpose of protecting . . . the public interest, the Immigration Judge may limit
attendance or hold a closed hearing.’” Id. (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 3.27(b) (2002)).
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 216.
280. N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 216.
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[I]n the jurisprudence developed thus far, the logic prong does not appear to do
much work in the Richmond Newspapers approach, for we have not found a
case in which a proceeding passed the experience test through its history of
openness [and] yet failed the logic test by not serving community values.281

To rectify this problem, the Third Circuit chose to consider both the
negative and positive implications of access. Judge Becker argued that this
approach would help the logic prong gain more force in the Richmond
Newspapers analysis.282
With the negative consequences of access in mind, the gloss of history
must have had a favorable impact on that particular proceeding.283 Judge
Becker ultimately agreed with Judge Keith that access to deportation
proceedings has had a favorable impact on the process. However, Judge
Becker concluded that the negative impact of access far outweighs the
favorable impact.284 The Third Circuit has identified six values typically
served by openness:
“[1] promotion of informed discussion of governmental affairs by providing
the public with the more complete understanding of the judicial system; [2]
promotion of the public perception of fairness which can be achieved only by
permitting full public view of the proceedings; [3] providing a significant
community therapeutic value as an outlet for community concern, hostility and
emotion; [4] serving as a check on corrupt practices by exposing the judicial
process to public scrutiny; [5] enhancement of the performance of all involved;
and [the] [6] discouragement of perjury.”285

While Judge Becker noted that access to deportation proceedings would
serve as a positive influence, he concluded that the threat to national security
was too great.286 He cautioned, “First, public hearings would necessarily
reveal sources and methods of investigation . . . which . . . allows a terrorist
organization to build a picture of the investigation.”287 Second, deportation
proceedings might reveal how a given deportee entered our country illegally.288
He stated that “putting entry information into the public realm regarding all
‘special interest cases’ would allow the terrorist organization to see patterns of
entry, what works and what doesn’t.”289 Third, there is a fear that open
deportation proceedings will reveal what evidence the government lacks in its

281. Id. at 202.
282. Id. at 217.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 217 (quoting U.S. v. Simone, 14 F.3d 833, 839 (3d
Cir. 1994)).
286. Id.
287. Id. at 218.
288. Id.
289. Id.
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war against terrorism.290 “Fourth, if a terrorist organization discovers that a
particular member is detained, or that information about a plot is known, it
may accelerate the timing of the planned attack, thus reducing the amount of
time the government has to detect and prevent it.”291 Fifth, a terrorist group
that gains knowledge about a particular proceeding might be able to create
false information and evidence.292 Access would slow investigations and
undermine the government’s efforts against terrorism.293 Sixth, detainees’
personal safety might become an issue if their identity is made known to the
public.294 The court concluded that national security interests at stake in the
case of deportation proceedings clearly outweigh the positive attributes
associated with access.295
Judge Becker decided that deportation proceedings did not satisfy the
Richmond Newspapers’ experience and logic test, and therefore, the First
Amendment does not protect public access to deportation proceedings.296
Judge Keith, on the other hand, determined that deportation proceedings did
pass the Richmond Newspapers’ experience and logic test, and therefore, the
hearings enjoy qualified First Amendment protection.297 In his view, the
government may close deportation proceedings without violating the First
Amendment if its methods are narrowly tailored; importantly, the Creppy
Directive is far too broad and therefore is unconstitutional.298
V. ANALYSIS
The two-part Richmond Newspapers standard has been left in a state of
ambiguity and confusion by the Supreme Court. In approaching right of access
cases, lower courts have failed to apply the Richmond Newspapers standard
consistently.299 Detroit Free Press and North Jersey Media Group illustrate
this difficulty in their inability to agree on the relative importance of the two
factors. While both Circuits applied the two-pronged Richmond Newspapers
standard, each judge’s application of that standard led to divergent
conclusions. These differences of opinion indicate a larger problem with the
Richmond Newspapers standard. Without further guidance from the Supreme
Court, each court has enjoyed significant flexibility in the application of the

290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 218.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 220.
Id. at 209.
Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 710 (6th Cir. 2002).
Id.
See, e.g., N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d 198; Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d 681.
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standard. Increased judicial discretion becomes a problem during times of
stress when external pressure might affect decision-making.300
The Sixth Circuit applied the Richmond Newspapers two-pronged test
correctly when Judge Keith concluded that the public enjoys a qualified First
Amendment right of access to deportation proceedings. The experience and
logic portions of the test are satisfied with respect to deportation proceedings
when one considers the test in the context in which it was created. The First
Amendment will support a right of access in order to fulfill its core purpose of
informed public debate.301 The experience and logic test was considered a
practical limitation on that right.302 A reviewing court should evaluate the
history of access to determine if access implies the favorable judgment of
experience to that particular proceeding.303 Equally important is the reviewing
court’s approach to the logic portion of the two-pronged test. Detroit Free
Press accurately portrays the way that the Richmond Newspapers test should
be applied.
A.

Richmond Newspapers Should Be Applied to Deportation Proceedings

In his concurring opinion in Richmond Newspapers, Justice Stevens wrote,
“Today . . . for the first time, the Court unequivocally holds that an arbitrary
interference with access to important information is an abridgment of the
freedoms of speech . . . protected by the First Amendment.”304 Although it is
clear that the Supreme Court issued a watershed opinion in Richmond
Newspapers, it failed to take the important step of overturning past cases that
refused to grant such a right. Houchins and Richmond Newspapers are
inconsistent with one another and the Court has failed to provide guidance on
how the conflict should be resolved. The distinction is undeniably important.
If the reviewing court in either North Jersey Media Group or Detroit Free
Press had chosen to apply the standard articulated in Houchins, there is no
question that the public and the press would not have access to deportation
proceedings. However, both Judge Keith and Judge Becker correctly
concluded that the standard articulated in the Richmond Newspapers opinion
should apply to the present question of access to deportation proceedings. This
is true for two reasons: (1) Supreme Court jurisprudence supports the
application of Richmond Newspapers outside the context of a criminal trial,
and (2) Detroit Free Press and North Jersey Media Group are factually similar
to the Richmond Newspapers decision and can be distinguished from
Houchins.

300.
301.
302.
303.
304.

Olson, supra note 10, at 488.
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980).
Id. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 583.
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Although the Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the question of
whether the First Amendment protects access outside the context of a criminal
trial, Richmond Newspapers and its progeny support the expansion of
protection. Justice Brennan has consistently advocated an expansive view of
First Amendment protection.305 A structural interpretation of the First
Amendment supports access to government information to ensure that public
debate of important issues will be informed.306 The court should not focus on
the type of proceeding at issue in a particular dispute, but rather on whether
access to that proceeding or information would support informed public
debate.307 Lower courts have interpreted Richmond Newspapers and its
progeny to provide a right of access that extends beyond the confines of the
criminal proceeding.308 Several circuit courts have agreed that the application
of Richmond Newspapers is appropriate not only in civil cases, but also in
administrative proceedings.309
The application of Richmond Newspapers is appropriate in both Detroit
Free Press and North Jersey Media Group because both cases are factually
distinguishable from Houchins. Justice Brennan admitted that “the First
Amendment has not been viewed by the Court in all settings as providing an
equally categorical assurance of the correlative freedom of access to
information.”310 Citing Houchins specifically to support that proposition,
Justice Brennan acknowledged that the First Amendment might not grant a
right of access in every situation, including prison facilities.311 Justice Burger
noted in his majority opinion in Richmond Newspapers that “penal
institutions . . . by definition, are not ‘open’ or public places.”312 Access to
government information when that information has historically been available
to the public is important to support the informed public debate.313 Unlike the
penal institutions at issue in Houchins, deportation proceedings are factually
distinguishable because they have traditionally been open to the public.314
Additionally, deportation proceedings are far more similar to the criminal
trial at issue in Richmond Newspapers than the prison system at issue in
Houchins. A deportation proceeding is “analogous to a trial held within the

305. See id. at 584-89.
306. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring).
307. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 605 n.13 (1982).
308. William Taylor, The Sixth Circuit Holds that the First Amendment Provides a Limited
Right of Public Access to Deportation Hearings, 56 SMU L. REV. 1051, 1053 (2003).
309. Id. at 1054.
310. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 585.
311. Id. at 586.
312. Id. at 577 n.11.
313. Id. at 589.
314. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 701 (6th Cir. 2002).
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judicial branch.”315 Like a criminal or civil proceeding, a deportee must
receive notice of the deportation proceeding.316 Evidence can be presented by
both parties and the deportee has the right to cross examine all witnesses.317
The deportee may appeal the decision by the immigration judge.318 “[T]hough
deportation is not technically a criminal proceeding, it visits a great hardship
on the individual and deprives him of the right to stay and live and work in this
land of freedom.”319 Like a criminal proceeding, the severity of punishment
attached to a deportation proceeding lends itself to the conclusion that
deportation proceedings are important sources of public interest.320 The First
Amendment supports the idea that “debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”321 As an issue of great public interest, it
is important that the courts apply the Richmond Newspapers experience and
logic standard to determine whether deportation proceedings enjoy First
Amendment protection.
B.

The Two-Part Richmond Newspapers Test

As noted, the application of the two-part standard is difficult in light of its
present ambiguity. Pending a decision from the Supreme Court, the lower
courts should look to Justice Brennan’s structural interpretation of the First
Amendment for guidance in the application of the two-part standard. The
experience and logic test was promulgated as a practical limitation on the right
of access. “This judicial task is as much a matter of sensitivity to practical
necessities as it is of abstract reasoning.”322 From this perspective, it seems
that Judge Keith of the Sixth Circuit interpreted and applied the Richmond
Newspapers standard correctly. Judge Keith assessed the experience prong by
evaluating whether or not deportation proceedings enjoyed “favorable
judgment of experience.”323 Additionally, the court considered both the
positive and negative consequence of access in the logic prong of the test.324
In doing so, Judge Keith correctly concluded that the First Amendment confers
a qualified right of access to deportation hearings.

315. Gabriel S. Oberfield, Press Rights in Peril: The Department of Justice Infringes Upon
Press Liberties by Conducting “Special Interest” Removal Proceedings, 13 FORDHAM INTELL.
PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1209, 1218 (2003).
316. Id. at 1217.
317. Id. at 1218.
318. Id.
319. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 696.
320. Id.
321. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 587 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
322. Id. at 588 (Brennan, J., concurring).
323. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 700.
324. Id. at 703-05.
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The Experience Prong

The basic disagreement between Judge Becker and Judge Keith
surrounding the experience prong centers on Judge Becker’s belief that
deportation proceedings do not have a history sufficient to satisfy the
Richmond Newspapers standard. Experience of openness is necessary because
“tradition of accessibility implies the favorable judgment of experiences.”325
As long as the history of access is sufficient to determine if the access has
implied a favorable judgment, the history of openness should be sufficient to
satisfy the experience standard. This is demonstrated in Press Enterprise II
when the Court used eighteenth- and nineteenth-century historical evidence to
satisfy the experience portion of the test. Despite the fact that pretrial
proceedings lacked a common law history of access, the Court concluded that
By
openness had revealed the favorable judgment of experience.326
approaching the test from a structural perspective, it is clear that history of
openness need not be as extensive as that articulated in the Richmond
Newspapers opinion. It is sufficient to determine whether or not access to
deportation proceedings implies the favorable judgment of experience. The
history need not reach common law origin in order to determine whether or not
the proceeding has this effect.
Although deportation proceedings lack a common law history of openness,
the history of openness has been consistent.327 “Before the September 11
attacks, the press and the public enjoyed a qualified right to observe
immigration court removal proceedings.”328
Immigration judges have
discretion to close deportation proceedings in limited circumstances.329 Based
on the fact that immigration judges possess this discretionary power and have
exercised it in select cases, Judge Becker concluded that the history of access
to deportation proceedings is “inconsistent” and “ambiguous.”330 The
immigration judge’s exercise of discretion in limited circumstances is
insufficient to deny First Amendment protection to deportation proceedings.
Supreme Court precedent regarding the right of access under the First
Amendment only recognized a “qualified right of access for criminal
proceedings, which may be restricted by a countervailing public interest.”331
For instance, the fact that criminal proceedings are often closed to the public in
instances of child and spousal abuse did not lead the Supreme Court to
325. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring).
326. Hayes, supra note 10, at 1130.
327. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 589.
328. Oberfield, supra note 315, at 1218-19.
329. Thomas V. Ayala, Issues in the Third Circuit: Development of the First Amendment
Right of Access to Adjudicatory Hearings in the Third Circuit: Does the Ongoing Threat of
Terrorism Call for a Secret Justice System?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1303, 1316 (2003).
330. See N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3rd Cir. 2002).
331. Id. at 222 (Scirica, J., dissenting) (citing Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 580-81).
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conclude that access to criminal proceedings has been inconsistent or
ambiguous.332
Because of the fact that deportation proceedings have been presumptively
open to the public subject to the limited discretion of the immigration judge to
close the proceedings in select cases, the experience of openness is sufficient to
satisfy the experience prong of the Richmond Newspapers test.
2.

The Logic Prong

After determining that deportation proceedings satisfy the experience
portion of the two-pronged test, one must also determine whether the logic
portion of the inquiry is satisfied. It is Justice Brennan’s determination that a
history of openness alone was insufficient to conclude that access to particular
government information should be afforded First Amendment protection.333
Rather, it is crucial to consider whether access is beneficial to that particular
process.334 If access is found to be beneficial to a particular government
proceeding, then experience and logic will both be satisfied and the First
Amendment will protect access to a particular proceeding.
Both Judge Becker and Judge Keith agree with the conclusion that
openness is beneficial to deportation proceedings. First, the similarity between
the deportation proceedings and criminal trials supports the conclusion that
openness would be positive.335 More specifically, access to deportation
proceedings would support fairness, inform the public of important
government functions, ensure the proper execution of this country’s
immigration laws and deportation proceedings and act as a check on any
abusive government practice.336 Access would also provide therapeutic value
to a community that has suffered tremendously following the terrorist attacks
on September 11, 2001.
The Supreme Court promulgated the logic standard in order to consider the
practical effect of access to a particular proceeding.337 If the practical effect of
access is assessed more accurately by looking at both the positive and negative
implications of access, then the true purpose of the logic standard has been
served. “An assertion of the prerogative to gather information must . . . be
assayed by considering the information sought and the opposing interests
invaded.”338 Justice Brennan therefore insists that the reviewing court
specifically evaluate the effect of access on a particular proceeding. Both the
Sixth Circuit and the Third Circuit considered the negative impact that access
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.

See id. at 222 n.3.
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 588-89 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 589.
See supra notes 314-320 and accompanying text.
See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 703-04 (6th Cir. 2002).
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 589 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 588.
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might have on deportation proceedings. However, the Sixth Circuit and the
Third Circuit disagreed regarding the negative impact of access. Judge Keith
concluded that “the government has not identified one persuasive reason why
openness would play a negative role in the process.”339 Considering both the
positive and negative impact of access to deportation proceedings as a whole,
Judge Keith correctly concluded access would play a positive role. Judge
Keith determined that national security concerns were limited to special
interest cases and therefore the concern was more appropriately considered as a
compelling interest under strict scrutiny.340
Judge Becker disagreed with Judge Keith’s application and chose instead
to consider national security in the logic portion of the Richmond Newspapers
analysis.341 Citing extensive evidence that open deportation proceedings
would threaten national security, Judge Becker concluded that the logic portion
of the Richmond Newspapers analysis had failed. However, this conclusion
was reached erroneously because “[a]t this stage, we must consider the value
of openness in deportation hearings generally, not its benefits and detriments in
‘special interest’ deportation hearings in particular.”342 Considerations that are
particular to a small sub-class of deportation proceedings rather than
deportation proceedings as a whole should be evaluated when the court
engages in a strict scrutiny analysis.343 Though national security is an
important consideration for special interest cases, it generally is not applicable
to all deportation proceedings. “There are many grounds for deportation—
marriage fraud, moral turpitude convictions, and aggravated felonies, to name
a few—that do not ordinarily implicate national security.”344 Because of the
fact that national security concerns do not affect the majority of deportation
proceedings, but rather such concerns are unique to a small number of
proceedings, national security concerns should be addressed when the court
engages in a strict scrutiny analysis.345
This conclusion is clearly grounded in the Supreme Court’s right of access
precedent. In Globe Newspaper, the Court considered the effect of open
access on criminal trials in general and not those involving minor sex
victims.346 After deciding that the public had a First Amendment right of
access in criminal proceedings, the Court concluded that the state may close
the rape cases involving minor victims on a case-by-case basis.347 The First
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.

Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 705.
Id.
See N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 217-18 (3rd Cir. 2002).
Id. at 225 (Scirica, J., dissenting).
See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super. Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 605 n.13 (1982).
N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 225 (Scirica, J., dissenting).
Id.
Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 605 n.13 (1982).
See supra notes 104-14 and accompanying text.
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Amendment right of access is a qualified right that may be restricted if a
compelling government interest exists and the government narrowly tailors the
restriction to meet that interest. However, a compelling government interest
that is present in a few, easily-identifiable cases is not sufficient to restrict
access to deportation proceedings as a whole. Therefore, the Third Circuit was
wrong in its denial of a First Amendment right of access to deportation
proceedings. The Sixth Circuit was correct in its conclusion that both the
experience and logic portion of the Richmond Newspapers test was satisfied
with respect to deportation proceedings, despite national security concerns.
C. Strict Scrutiny
It has been sufficiently established that the public should enjoy a
constitutional right of access under the First Amendment. Not only is the
Richmond Newspapers test correctly applied in Detroit Free Press, it is clearly
satisfied with respect to deportation proceedings. The Sixth Circuit validly
concluded that the First Amendment affords the press and public a qualified
right to deportation proceedings. However, the government may regulate and
restrict access to information if it has a compelling government interest and the
restriction is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.348 The strict scrutiny
analysis ensures that the government will be able to protect its compelling
interests while protecting individual First Amendment rights.
The government claimed that national security is a compelling reason to
close deportation proceedings in special interest cases. The government
argued that “[c]losure of removal proceedings in special interest cases is
necessary to protect national security by safeguarding the Government’s
investigation of the September 11 terrorist attack and other terrorist
conspiracies.”349 In light of the government’s interest in national security,
especially in cases of terrorism, the Sixth Circuit was justified in deferring to
the government’s assertion that open deportation proceedings implicate
national security concerns. “Courts have consistently recognized the need for
‘heightened deference to the judgments of the political branches with respect to
matters of national security’ when ‘terrorism or other special circumstances’
are at issue.”350 However, “deference is not a basis for abdicating our
responsibilities under the First Amendment.”351 Therefore, the government
must make specific findings that the Creppy Directive is narrowly tailored in
order to shield First Amendment right of access.

348. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606-07.
349. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 705 (6th Cir. 2002).
350. N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 226 (quoting Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696
(2001)).
351. Id.
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While the government’s interest in national security is compelling, it does
not provide the basis for broad restriction of access in all cases the Attorney
General deems special interest cases. The Supreme Court and the First
Amendment require that the government narrowly tailor its restrictions in order
to protect First Amendment interests. Closure is only appropriate if
“‘reasonable alternatives to closure’ are not available to protect the
government’s interests.”352 The court should not support a government
restriction unless that restriction clearly serves national security interests.
Detroit Free Press correctly concluded that the government failed to narrow its
restriction carefully. The Creppy Directive fails to secure the government’s
interest and fails to recognize that closure could be handled on a case-by-case
basis. Therefore, the Creppy Directive is an unconstitutional restriction on the
public’s right of access to deportation proceedings.
VI. CONCLUSION: A VALID COMPROMISE
Despite the circumstances under which Detroit Free Press and North
Jersey Media Group reached the Third and Sixth Circuits, it is clear that the
conflict can be resolved by a closer look at the principles articulated in the
Richmond Newspapers opinion.
When Justice Brennan issued his
groundbreaking concurrence in Richmond Newspapers, he was ultimately
concerned that a structural view of the First Amendment would create a
limitless right of access.353 The practical limitations inherent in a limitless
right would have burdened the political branches. Therefore, Justice Brennan
restricted this right by creating the experience and logic test. This limitation is
meant to assess the practical limitations of allowing access to a particular
proceeding.354 At times of national crisis, like September 11, it is easy to
forget the importance of a right of access and the civil rights that Richmond
Newspapers serves to protect. Judge Keith applied the Richmond Newspapers
standard correctly and recognized a qualified right of access to deportation
proceedings.355 This opinion considers national security interests without
unduly burdening First Amendment liberties.
Judge Becker is validly concerned that free and open access to all
deportation proceedings might jeopardize national security in particular cases.
However, it is important that the judiciary balance the interest in national
security with First Amendment rights. As George W. Bush so poignantly
noted in the days following the September 11 attacks: “We are in a fight for

352.
353.
354.
355.

Id. at 225-26 (quoting Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 14 (1986)).
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 588 (1980).
Id. at 588-89.
Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 700 (6th Cir. 2002).
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our principles, and our first responsibility is to live by them.”356 Judge Keith
accurately captures the balance between national security and civil liberties by
allowing public access to deportation proceedings. By eliminating broad
closures of special interest cases, individual First Amendment freedoms are
guarded while cases posing a specific and demonstrated risk to national
security will remain closed to the public.
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